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Abstract
This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users over a Gaussian inter-
ference channel. The usual information theoretic approach assumes full cooperation among users for
codebook and rate selection. In the scenario investigated here, each user is willing to coordinate its
actions only when an incentive exists and benefits of cooperation are fairly allocated. The users are
first allowed to negotiate for the use of a simple Han-Kobayashi type scheme with fixed power split.
Conditions for which users have incentives to cooperate are identified. Then, two different approaches
are used to solve the associated bargaining problem. First, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is
used as a tool to get fair information rates and the operating point is obtained as a result of an
optimization problem. Next, a dynamic alternating-offer bargaining game (AOBG) from bargaining
theory is introduced to model the bargaining process and the rates resulting from negotiation are
characterized. The relationship between the NBS and the equilibrium outcome of the AOBG is studied
and factors that may affect the bargaining outcome are discussed. Finally, under certain high signal-to-
noise ratio regimes, the bargaining problem for the generalized degrees of freedom is studied.
Index Terms
Gaussian interference channel, selfish user, coordination, bargaining
This material is based upon work partially supported by NSF Grant No. 0635177, and by the Center for Advanced Technology
in Telecommunications (CATT) of Polytechnic Institute of NYU.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Interference channel (IC) is a fundamental model in information theory for studying interfer-
ence in communication systems. In this model, multiple senders transmit independent messages to
their corresponding receivers via a common channel. The capacity region or the sum-rate capacity
for the two-user Gaussian IC is only known in special cases such as the strong interference case
[1] [2] or the noisy interference case [3]; the characterization of the capacity region for the general
case remains an open problem. Recently, it has been shown in [4] that a simplified version of a
scheme due to Han and Kobayashi [2] results in an achievable rate region that is within one bit of
the capacity region of the complex Gaussian IC for all values of channel parameters. However,
any type of Han-Kobayashi (H-K) scheme requires full cooperation1 between the two users
through the choice of transmission strategy. In practice, users are selfish in the sense that they
choose a transmission strategy to maximize their own rates. They may not have an incentive to
comply with a certain rule as in the H-K scheme and therefore not all rate pairs in an achievable
rate region are actually attainable. When there is no coordination among the users, interference
is usually treated as noise, which is information theoretically suboptimal in most cases.
In this paper, we study a scenario where two users operating over a Gaussian IC are selfish
but willing to coordinate and bargain to get fair information rates. When users have conflicting
interests, the problem of achieving efficiency and fairness could be formulated as a game-theoretic
problem. The Gaussian IC was studied using noncooperative game theory in [6] [7] [8], where it
was assumed that the receivers treat the interference as Gaussian noise. For the related Gaussian
multiple-access channel (MAC), it was shown in [9] that in a noncooperative rate game with two
selfish users choosing their transmission rates independently, all points on the dominant face of
the capacity region are pure strategy Nash Equilibria (NE). However, no single NE is superior
to the others, making it impossible to single out one particular NE to operate at. The authors
resorted to a mixed strategy which is inefficient in performance. Noncooperative information
theoretic games were considered by Berry and Tse in [10] assuming that each user can select
1Throughout the paper, “cooperation” means cooperation for the choice of transmission strategy including codebook and rate
selection, which is different from cooperation in information transmission as in cooperative communications [5].
3any encoding and decoding strategy to maximize its own rate and a Nash equilibrium region was
characterized for a class of deterministic IC’s. Extensions were made to a symmetric Gaussian
IC in [11].
Another game theoretic approach for studying interfering links is through cooperative game
theory. Coalitional games were studied in [12] for a Gaussian MAC and in [13] [14] for Gaussian
IC’s. In [13], the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is considered for a Gaussian IC under the
assumption of receiver cooperation, effectively translating the channel to a MAC. In [15], the
NBS was used as a tool to develop a fair resource allocation algorithm for uplink multi-user
OFDMA systems. References [16] [17] analyzed the NBS for the flat and frequency selective
fading IC under the assumption of time or frequency division multiplexing (TDM/FDM). The
emphasis there was on the weak interference case2. However, as we will show later, for the
strong and mixed interference regimes, the NBS based on TDM/FDM may not perform very
well, due to the suboptimality of TDM/FDM in those regimes. Game theoretic solutions for
the MISO and MIMO IC based on bargaining have been investigated in [18] [8] [19], where
two or more users negotiate for an agreement on the choice of beamforming vectors or source
covariance matrices whereas single-user detection is employed at the receivers.
In this paper, unlike the above literature, we allow for the use of H-K type schemes thereby
resulting in a larger rate region and let the two users bargain on choices of codebook and rate to
improve their achieved rates or generalized degrees of freedom compared with the uncoordinated
case. We propose a two-phase mechanism for coordination between users. In the first phase, the
two users negotiate and only if certain incentive conditions are satisfied they agree to use a
simple H-K type scheme with a fixed power split that gives the optimal or close to optimal
set of achievable rates [4]. For different types of IC’s, we study the incentive conditions for
users to coordinate their transmissions. In the second phase, provided that negotiation in the first
phase is successful, the users bargain for rates over the H-K achievable rate region to find an
acceptable operating point. Our primary contribution is the application of two different bargaining
2In the NBS discussed in [16] [17], it is assumed that a unique NE of an Gaussian interference game defined there exists and
is selected as disagreement point. Typically, the NE is unique only when both interferences are weaker than the desired signals.
4ideas from game theory to address the bargaining problem in the second phase: the cooperative
bargaining approach using NBS and the noncooperative bargaining approach using alternating-
offer bargaining games (AOBG). The advantage of the NBS is that it not only provides a Pareto
optimal operating point from the point of view of the entire system, but is also consistent with
the fairness axioms of game theory. However, one of the assumptions upon which cooperative
bargaining is built is that the users are committed to the agreement reached in bargaining when
the time comes for it to be implemented [20]. In this sense, the NBS may not necessarily be
the agreement reached in practice. Before the NBS can be used as the operating point, some
form of centralized coordination is still needed to ensure that all the parties involved jointly
agree to operate at such a point. In an unregulated environment, a centralized authority may
be lacking and in such cases more realistic bargaining between users through communication
over a side channel may become necessary. Besides, in most works that designate the NBS as
a desired solution, each user’s cost of delay in bargaining is not taken into account and little
is known regarding how bargaining proceeds. Motivated by all these, we will also study the
bargaining problem under the noncooperative bargaining model AOBG [20] [21] over the IC.
This approach is different from the NBS in that it models the bargaining process between users
explicitly as a non-cooperative multi-stage game in which the users alternate making offers until
one is accepted. The equilibrium of such a game describes what bargaining strategies would
be adopted by the users and thus provides a nice prediction to the result of noncooperative
bargaining. To the best of our knowledge, our work provides the first application of dynamic
AOBG from bargaining theory to network information theory.
Under the cooperative bargaining approach, the computation of the NBS over the H-K rate
region is formulated as a convex optimization problem. Results show that the NBS exhibits
significant rate improvements for both users compared with the uncoordinated case. Under the
noncooperative bargaining approach, the two-user IC bargaining problem is considered in an
uncoordinated environment where the ongoing bargaining may be interrupted, for example, by
other users wishing to access the channel. Each user’s cost of delay in bargaining is derived from
an exogenous probability which characterizes the risk of breakdown of bargaining due to some
5outside intervention. The AOBG with risk of breakdown is introduced to model the bargaining
process and the negotiation outcome in terms of achievable rates is analyzed. We show that the
equilibrium outcome of the AOBG lies on the individual rational efficient frontier of the rate
region with its exact location depending on the exogenous probabilities of breakdown. When
the breakdown probabilities are very small, it is shown that the equilibrium outcome approaches
the Nash solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the channel
model, describe the achievable region of a simple H-K type scheme using Gaussian codebooks
and review the concept of the NBS and that of AOBG from game theory. We first illustrate how
two selfish users bargain over the Gaussian MAC to get higher rates for both in Section III and
then present the mechanism of coordination and bargaining for the two users over the Gaussian
IC in Section IV. In Section V we consider the bargaining problem in certain high SNR regimes
when the utility of each selfish user is measured by achieved generalized degree of freedom
(g.d.o.f.) instead of allocated rate, and finally we draw conclusions in Section VI.
Before, we proceed to the next section, we introduce some notations that will be used in this
paper.
• Italic letters (e.g. x, X) denote scalars; and bold letters x and X denote column vectors or
matrices.
• 0 denotes the all-zero vector.
• Xt and X−1 denote the transpose and inverse of the matrix X respectively.
• For any two vectors u and v, we denote u ≥ v if and only if ui ≥ vi for all i. u ≤ v,
u > v and u < v are defined similarly.
• C(·) is defined as C(x) = 1
2
log2(1 + x).
• (·)+ means max(·, 0).
• R denotes the set of real numbers.
6II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Channel Model
In this paper, we focus on the two-user standard Gaussian IC [22] as shown in Fig. 1
Y1,t = X1,t +
√
aX2,t + Z1,t (1)
Y2,t =
√
bX1,t +X2,t + Z2,t (2)
where Xi,t and Yi,t, t = 1, ..., n represent the input and output at transmitter and receiver i ∈
{1, 2} at time t, respectively, and Z1,t and Z2,t are i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and unit
variance. Receiver i is only interested in the message sent by transmitter i. For a given block
length n, user i sends a message Wi ∈ {1, 2, .., 2nRi} by encoding it to a codeword Xi =
(Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,n). The codewords X1 and X2 satisfy the average power constraints given by
1
n
n∑
t=1
X21,t ≤ P1,
1
n
n∑
t=1
X22,t ≤ P2 (3)
Receiver i observes the channel output Yi = (Yi,1, Yi,2, ..., Yi,n) and uses a decoding function
fi : R
n → {1, .., 2nRi} to get the estimate Wˆi of the transmitted message Wi. We define the
average probabilities of error by the expressions
pne,1 = P{f1(Y1) 6= W1} (4)
pne,2 = P{f2(Y2) 6= W2} (5)
and
pne = max{pne,1, pne,2}. (6)
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if there is a sequence of (2nR1 , 2nR2, n) codes with
pne → 0 as n→∞. The capacity region of the interference channel is the closure of the set of
all achievable rate pairs.
Constants
√
a and
√
b represent the real-valued channel gains of the interfering links. De-
pending on the values of a and b, the two-user Gaussian IC can be classified as strong, weak
7and mixed. If a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1, the channel is strong Gaussian IC; if 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b < 1,
the channel is weak Gaussian IC; if either 0 < a < 1 and b ≥ 1, or 0 < b < 1 and a ≥ 1, the
channel is mixed Gaussian IC. We let SNRi = Pi be the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of user i,
and INR1 = aP2(INR2 = bP1) be the interference to noise ratio (INR) of user 1(2).
B. The Han-Kobayashi Rate Region
The best known inner bound for the two-user Gaussian IC is given by the full H-K achievable
region [2]. Even when the input distributions in the H-K scheme are restricted to be Gaussian,
computation of the full H-K region by taking the union of all power splits into common and
private messages and time sharing remains difficult due to numerous degrees of freedom involved
in the problem [23]. Therefore for the purpose of evaluating and computing bargaining solutions,
we assume users employ Gaussian codebooks with equal length codewords and consider a
simplified H-K type scheme with fixed power split and no time-sharing as in [4]. Let α ∈ [0, 1]
and β ∈ [0, 1] denote the fractions of power allocated to the private messages (messages only to
be decoded at intended receivers) of user 1 and user 2 respectively. We define F as the collection
of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤ φ1 = C
(
P1
1 + aβP2
)
(7)
R2 ≤ φ2 = C
(
P2
1 + bαP1
)
(8)
R1 +R2 ≤ φ3 = min{φ31, φ32, φ33} (9)
with
φ31 = C
(
P1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
βP2
1 + bαP1
)
(10)
φ32 = C
(
αP1
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
P2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
(11)
φ33 = C
(
αP1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
βP2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
(12)
8and
2R1 +R2 ≤ φ4 = C
(
P1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
αP1
1 + aβP2
)
+C
(
βP2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
) (13)
R1 + 2R2 ≤ φ5 = C
(
P2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
+ C
(
βP2
1 + bαP1
)
+C
(
αP1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
) (14)
The region F is a polytope and a function of α and β. We denote the H-K scheme that
achieves the rate region F by HK(α, β). For convenience, we also represent F in a matrix
form as F = {R|R ≥ 0, R ≤ R1, and A0R ≤ B0}, where R = (R1 R2)t, R1 = (φ1 φ2)t,
B0 = (φ3 φ4 φ5)
t
, and
A0 =

 1 2 1
1 1 2


t
(15)
In the strong interference regime a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1, the capacity region is known [1] [2] and
is achieved by HK(0, 0), i.e., both users send common messages only to be decoded at both
destinations. This capacity region is the collection of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ C(P1),
R2 ≤ C(P2),
R1 +R2 ≤ φ6 = min{C(P1 + aP2), C(bP1 + P2)} (16)
Note that φ6 = φ3 for α = β = 0.
C. Overview of Bargaining Games
A two-player bargaining problem consists of a pair (G, g0) where G is a closed convex subset
of R2, g0 = (g01 g02)t is a vector in R2, and the set G ∩ {g|g ≥ g0} is nonempty and bounded.
Here G is the set of all possible payoff allocations or agreements that the two players can jointly
achieve, and g0 ∈ G is the payoff allocation that results if players fail to agree. We refer to G
as the feasible set and to g0 as the disagreement point. The set G ∩ {g|g ≥ g0} is a subset
9of G which contains all payoff allocations no worse than g0. We refer to it as the individual
rational feasible set. We say the bargaining problem (G, g0) is essential iff there exists at least
one allocation g′ in G that is strictly better for both players than g0, i.e., the set G ∩{g|g > g0}
is nonempty; we say (G, g0) is regular iff G is essential and for any payoff allocation g in G,
if g1 > g01, then ∃gˇ ∈ G such that g01 ≤ gˇ1 < g1 and gˇ2 > g2, (17)
if g2 > g02, then ∃gˆ ∈ G such that g02 ≤ gˆ2 < g2 and gˆ1 > g1, (18)
Here (17) and (18) state that whenever a player gets strictly higher payoff than in the disagreement
point, then there exists another allocation such that the payoff of the player is reduced while the
other player’s payoff is strictly increased.
An agreement g is said to be efficient iff there is no agreement in the feasible set G that makes
every player strictly better off. It is said to be strongly efficient or Pareto optimal iff there is
no other agreement that makes every player at least as well off and at least one player strictly
better off. We refer to the set of all efficient agreements as the efficient frontier of G. In addition,
we refer to the efficient frontier of the individual rational feasible set G ∩ {g|g ≥ g0} as the
individual rational efficient frontier. Given that G is closed and convex, the regularity conditions
in (17) and (18) hold iff the individual rational efficient frontier is strictly monotone, i.e., it
contains no horizonal or vertical line segments. An example illustrating the concepts defined
above is shown in Fig. 2. The bargaining problem described in Fig. 2 is regular.
We next describe two different bargaining approaches to solving the bargaining problem: NBS
and AOBG.
1) Nash Bargaining Solution: This bargaining problem is approached axiomatically by Nash
[24]. In this approach, g∗ = Φ(G, g0) is said to be an NBS in G for g0, if the following axioms
are satisfied.
1) Individual Rationality: Φi(G, g0) ≥ g0i , ∀i
2) Feasibility: Φ(G, g0) ∈ G
3) Pareto Optimality: Φ(G, g0) is Pareto optimal.
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4) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For any closed convex set G ′, if G ′ ⊆ G and
Φ(G, g0) ∈ G ′, then Φ(G ′, g0) = Φ(G, g0).
5) Scale Invariance: For any numbers λ1, λ2, γ1 and γ2, such that λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0, if
G ′ = {(λ1g1+ γ1, λ2g2+ γ2)|(g1, g2) ∈ G} and ω = (λ1g01 + γ1, λ2g02 + γ2), then Φ(G ′, ω) =
(λ1Φ1(G, g0) + γ1, λ2Φ2(G, g0) + γ2).
6) Symmetry: If g01 = g02 , and {(g2, g1)|(g1, g2) ∈ G} = G, then Φ1(G, g0) = Φ2(G, g0).
Axioms (4)-(6) are also called axioms of fairness.
Theorem 1: [24] There is a unique solution g∗ = Φ(G, g0) that satisfies all of the above six
axioms. This solution is given by,
Φ(G, g0) = arg max
g∈G,g≥g0
2∏
i=1
(gi − g0i ) (19)
The NBS selects the unique allocation that maximizes the Nash product in (19) over all
feasible individual rational allocations in G ∩{g|g ≥ g0}. Note that for any essential bargaining
problem, the Nash point should always satisfy g∗i > g0i , ∀i.
2) The Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers: In the cooperative approach to the bargaining
problem (G, g0), the NBS is the solution that satisfies a list of properties such as Pareto opti-
mality and fairness. However, using this approach, most information concerning the bargaining
environment and procedure is abstracted away, and each user’ cost of delay in bargaining is not
taken into account. A dynamic noncooperative model of bargaining called the alternating-offer
bargaining game, on the other hand, provides a detailed description of the bargaining process.
In the AOBG, two users take turns in making proposals of payoff allocation in G until one is
accepted or negotiation breaks down.
An important issue regarding modeling of the AOBG is about players’ cost of delay in
bargaining, as they are directly related to users’ motives to settle in an agreement rather than insist
indefinitely on incompatible demands. Two common motivations are their sensitivity to time of
delay in bargaining and their fear for the risk of breakdown of negotiation [25]. In the bargaining
game we consider in this paper, we derive users’ cost of delay in bargaining from an exogenous
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risk of breakdown; i.e., after each round, the bargaining process may terminate in disagreement
permanently with an exogenous positive probability if the proposal made in that round gets
rejected. In a wireless network, this probability could correspond to the event that other users
present in the environment intervene and snatch the opportunity of negotiation on transmission
strategies between a pair of users. For example, consider an uncoordinated environment when
multiple users operate over a common channel. By default each user’s receiver only decodes
the intended message from its transmitter and treats the other users’ signals as noise. However,
groups of users are allowed to coordinate their transmission strategies to improve their respective
rates. In the case of a two-user group, if one user’s proposal gets rejected by the other user in
any bargaining round, it is reasonable to assume that it may terminate the bargaining process
and turn to a third user for negotiation. The succeeding analysis for the AOBG with risk of
breakdown is based on an extensive game with perfect information and chance moves from
game theory [21]. For completeness, a review of the related concepts from game theory is given
in Appendix A.
Consider a regular bargaining problem (G, g0) and the two players involved play a dynamic
noncooperative game to determine an outcome. Let p1 and p2 be the probabilities of breakdown
that satisfy 0 < p1 < 1 and 0 < p2 < 1. These probabilities of breakdown reflect the users’ cost
of delay in bargaining and are assumed to be known by both users. The bargaining procedure of
this game is as follows. Player 1 and player 2 alternate making an offer in every odd-numbered
round and every even-numbered round respectively. An offer made in each round can be any
agreement in the feasible set G. Within each round, after the player whose turn it is to offer
announces the proposal, the other player can either accept or reject. In any odd-numbered round,
if player 2 rejects the offer made by player 1, there is a probability p1 that the bargaining will
end in the disagreement g0. Similarly, in any even-numbered round, if player 1 rejects the offer
made by player 2, there is a probability p2 that the bargaining will end in the disagreement g0.
This process begins from round 1 and continues until some offer is accepted or the game ends
in disagreement. When an offer is accepted, an agreement is applied and thus the users get the
payoffs specified in the accepted offer. Note in the game described above, the two players only
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get payoffs at a single round in this game, which is the round at which the bargaining ends in
either agreement or disagreement.
A formal description of the above process in the context of an extensive game with perfect
information and chance moves introduced in Appendix A is as follows. The player set is N =
{1, 2}. Let T = {1, 2, 3, ...} denote the index set of bargaining rounds. There is no limit on the
number of bargaining rounds. We denote the offer made at round t as o(t). The set of histories
H is the set of all sequences of one of the following types:
I ∅, or (o(1), Re, Cn, o(2), Re, Cn, ..., o(t), Re, Cn)
II (o(1), Re, Cn, o(2), Re, Cn, ..., o(t))
III (o(1), Re, Cn, o(2), Re, Cn, ..., o(t), Ac)
IV (o(1), Re, Cn, o(2), Re, Cn, ..., o(t), Re)
V (o(1), Re, Cn, o(2), Re, Cn, ..., o(t), Re, Br)
VI (o(1), Re, Cn, o(2), Re, Cn, ...)
where t ∈ T , o(t) ∈ G for all t, Ac means “accept”, Re means “reject”, Cn means bargaining
continues and Br means “breakdown”. Histories of Type III, type V and type VI are terminal
and those of type VI are infinite. Given a nonterminal history h, the player whose turn it is
to take an action chooses an agreement in G as a proposal after a history of type I, chooses a
member of {Ac,Re} after a history of type II and chooses a member of {Cn,Br} after a history
of type IV. The player function specifying which player takes an action after a history h is given
by: P (h) = 1 if h is of either type I or type II and t is even or if h is empty; P (h) = 2 if h is
of either type I or type II and t is odd; P (h) = c (it is “chance”’s turn to move) if h is of type
IV. For each h ∈ H with P (h) = c, the probability measure fc(·|h) is given by: fc(Br|h) = p1
and fc(Cn|h) = 1 − p1 if h is of type IV and t is odd; fc(Br|h) = p2 and fc(Cn|h) = 1 − p2
if h is of type IV and t is even. Player i’s strategy si in the game specifies its action to take
at any stage of the game when it is its turn to move. When chance moves are present, we need
to specify the players’ preferences (i) over the set of lotteries3 over terminal histories. We
3Recall that, from Appendix A, when there are chance moves, the outcome of a strategy profile s = (si)i∈N is a probability
distribution (or a lottery) over a set of terminal histories instead of a single terminal history.
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assume these preferences depend only on the final agreements4 reached in the terminal histories
of lotteries and not on the path of rejected agreements that preceded them. Moreover, player i’s
preference relation i over the set of all feasible agreements G can be represented by its payoff
gi where g ∈ G.
Theorem 2: For any regular two-player bargaining problem (G, g0), the corresponding AOBG
described above has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). Let (g¯, g˜) be the unique pair
of efficient agreements in G which satisfy
g˜1 = (1− p2)(g¯1 − g01) + g01 (20)
g¯2 = (1− p1)(g˜2 − g02) + g02 (21)
Let oi(t) denote user i’s payoff in the offer made in round t. In the subgame perfect equilibrium,
the strategy of player 1 is given by
s1(h) =


g¯ if h is of type I and t is even
Ac if h is of type II, t is even, and o1(t) ≥ g˜1
Re if h is of type II, t is even, and o1(t) < g˜1
(22)
and that of player 2 is given by
s2(h) =


g˜ if h is of type I and t is odd
Ac if h is of type II, t is odd, and o2(t) ≥ g¯2
Re if h is of type II, t is even, and o2(t) < g¯2
(23)
That is, player 1 always proposes an offer g¯ and accepts any offer g with g1 ≥ g˜1; user 2 always
proposes an offer g˜ and accepts any offer g with g2 ≥ g¯2. Using these strategies, the outcome
of the game is simply a single terminal history (g¯, Ac). Therefore, in equilibrium, the game will
end in an agreement on g¯ at round 1.
4If the terminal history h is of type III, the agreement is the last offer o(t) in h; if h is of type V instead, the agreement is
the disagreement point g0. Also note that terminal histories of type VI do not occur with positive probability.
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Notations Meanings
G feasible set
gi user i’s payoff in agreement g
g0 disagreement point
g∗, Φ(G,g0) NBS of (G,g0)
pi probability of breakdown when user i’s offer is rejected
o(t) offer made at round t
H set of histories (defined in Appendix A)
h a history (defined in Appendix A)
P (h) player function (defined in Appendix A)
fc(·|h) probability measure (defined in Appendix A)
si(h) player i’s strategy (defined in Appendix A)
Ac accept
Re reject
Br breakdown
g¯ offer of user 1 in subgame perfect equilibrium
g˜ offer of user 2 in subgame perfect equilibrium
TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN SECTION II-C.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 8.3 in [24] with the
disagreement outcome fixed to g0 after the breakdown in any round. Regularity of the bargaining
problem is essential for the proof of the uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In [25], it is found that as p1 and p2 approach to zero, the equilibrium outcome of the AOBG
converges to the NBS. In other words, if there are no external forces to terminate the bargaining
process, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game approaches the NBS. More discussion
will be given on how the probabilities of breakdown p1 and p2 affect the equilibrium outcome
of the bargaining game in the later sections.
For convenience, Table I summarizes various notations used in this subsection.
III. BARGAINING OVER THE TWO-USER GAUSSIAN MAC
Before we move to the Gaussian IC, we first illustrate the bargaining framework for a Gaussian
MAC in which two users send information to one common receiver. Cooperative bargaining
using the NBS has been discussed before for the MAC in [13]. In this section, we reconsider
the bargaining problem in the two-user case and provide a closed-form solution for the NBS.
Besides, we also study the bargaining outcome when a noncooperative bargaining approach is
15
used. The results here also form the foundation for the solution of the strong IC, which will be
studied later. The channel is
Yt = X1,t +X2,t + Zt (24)
where Xi,t is the input of user i, Yt is the output and Zt is i.i.d. Gaussian noise with zero
mean and unit variance at time t = 1, 2, ..., n. Each user has an individual average input power
constraint Pi given by (3). The capacity region C0 is the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
Ri ≤ C(Pi), i ∈ {1, 2} (25)
R1 +R2 ≤ C(P1 + P2) = φ0 (26)
If the two users fully cooperate in codebook and rate selection, any point in C0 is achievable.
When there is no coordination between users, in the worst case, one user’s signal can be treated
as noise in the decoding of the other user, leading to rate R0i = C( Pi1+P3−i ) for user i. In [9],
R0i is also called user i’s “safe rate”. If the two users are selfish but willing to coordinate for
mutual benefits, they may bargain over C0 to obtain a preferred operating point with R0 serving
as a disagreement point. In the following, we focus on how to find the solution to the bargaining
problem (C0,R0) using both the NBS approach and the AOBG approach respectively.
A. The NBS Approach
It can be easily observed that the feasible set C0 in the MAC case is bounded by only three
linear constraints on R1 and R2. Before we move to determine the NBS in the MAC case, we
first solve the NBS to the bargaining problem with a more general feasible set G and a particular
disagreement point g0, the results of which will also be useful for the IC case in Section IV and
Section V. We assume the feasible set G has the following general form:
G = {g ∈ R2|g ≥ 0, g ≤ g1 and Ag ≤ B} (27)
where g1 is a 2× 1 vector that contains the maximum possible payoff for each user, the J × 2
matrix A = (Aji) and the J × 1 vector B are related to the J linear constraints.
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Proposition 1: Assuming that g0 < g1 and Ag0 < B, there exists a unique NBS g∗ for the
bargaining problem (G, g0), which is given by
g∗i = min
{
g1i ; g
0
i +
1∑J
j=1 µjAji
}
, i ∈ {1, 2} (28)
where the Lagrange multipliers µj ≥ 0 (j ∈ {1, ..., J}) are found by solving (Ag∗−B)jµj = 0
and Ag∗ ≤ B.
Proof: Maximizing the Nash product in (19) is equivalent to maximizing its logarithm.
Define m(g) = ln(g1−g01)+ ln(g2−g02), then m(·) : G ∩{g|g ≥ g0} → R+ is a strictly concave
function of g. Also note that the constraints (Ag)j ≤ Bj , j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} are linear in g1 and
g2. So the first order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality
[26]. Let L(g, λ, ν, µ) denote the Lagrangian function and λi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, νi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 and
µj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, ..., J denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints, then we
have
L(g, λ, ν, µ) = m(g) +
∑
2
i=1 λi(gi − g0i ) +
∑
2
i=1 νi(g
1
i − gi) +
∑J
j=1 µj(Bj − (Ag)j) (29)
The first-order necessary and sufficient conditions yield
1 +
(
λi − νi −
J∑
j=1
µjAji
)
(g∗i − g0i ) = 0; i = 1, 2 (30)
and
(g∗i − g0i )λi = 0; λi ≥ 0; i = 1, 2 (31)
(g1i − g∗i )νi = 0; νi ≥ 0; i = 1, 2 (32)
((Ag∗)j − Bj)µj = 0; µl ≥ 0; j = 1, 2, ..., J (33)
Since g∗i > g0i must hold, we have λi = 0 for i = 1, 2. In addition, if g∗i < g1i , then νi = 0;
otherwise g∗i = g1i . Thus, the results in Proposition 1 follow.
In the MAC case, we have G = C0, g0 = (C( P11+P2 ) C( P21+P1 ))t, g1 = (C(P1) C(P2))t,
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A = (1 1) and B = φ0 in Proposition 1. Note the conditions g0 < g1 and Ag0 < B always
hold; i.e., both users operating over the MAC always have incentives to cooperate. Since the
only linear constraint is always active (i.e., µ1 > 0), the optimization problem can be solved
fully and has a closed-form solution as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: There exists a unique NBS for the two-user Gaussian MAC bargaining problem
(C0,R0), given by
R∗ = (R01 +
1
µ1
R02 +
1
µ1
)t (34)
where µ1 = 2φ0−R01−R02 .
B. The AOBG Approach
In this subsection, we apply the AOBG framework to the case of two-user MAC and analyze
the negotiation results.
For the two-user MAC bargaining problem (C0,R0), the individual rational efficient frontier
is strictly monotone and thus the regularity conditions in Section II always hold. Hence, using
Theorem 2, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3: For the two-user MAC bargaining problem (C0,R0), the unique pair of agree-
ments (R¯, R˜) in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the AOBG is given by
(R¯1 R¯2 R˜1 R˜2)
t = M−1(−p2R01 p1R02 φ0 φ0)t (35)
where
M =


1− p2 0 −1 0
0 1 0 −(1 − p1)
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1


(36)
In equilibrium, the game will end in an agreement on R¯ at round 1.
Proof: From (20) and (21) in Theorem 2, it follows that the unique pair of agreements
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(R¯, R˜) in the subgame perfect equilibrium must satisfy
R˜1 = (1− p2)(R¯1 − R01) +R01 (37)
R¯2 = (1− p1)(R˜2 − R02) +R02 (38)
In addition, since R¯ and R˜ need to be efficient agreements, we have
R¯1 + R¯2 = φ0 (39)
R˜1 + R˜2 = φ0 (40)
Solving (37), (38), (39) and (40), we obtain the unique pair of agreements (R¯, R˜) as in the
proposition.
Clearly, if user 2 makes an offer during the first round instead, the equilibrium outcome would
be R˜. It is not hard to see from (37), (38) that if p1 = p2 = 0, then we have R˜ = R¯.
In Fig. 3, the capacity region, the disagreement point and the NBS obtained using Proposition
2 are illustrated for SNR1 = 20dB and SNR2 = 15dB. Recall that the mixed strategy NE in [9]
has an average performance equal to the safe rates in R0. The NBS point which is the unique fair
Pareto-optimal point in C0 is component-wise superior. This shows that bargaining can improve
the rates for both selfish users in a MAC. Also included are the unique pairs of agreements
(R¯, R˜) in Proposition 3 for two different choices of p1 and p2. Recall that offer of user 1 in
subgame perfect equilibrium R¯ corresponds to the equilibrium outcome of the AOBG since we
assume user 1 makes an offer first. If user 2 is the first mover instead, offer of user 2 in subgame
perfect equilibrium R˜ becomes the equilibrium outcome of the game. For a fixed pair of p1 and
p2, each user’s rate in the equilibrium outcome is higher when it is the first mover than when it
is not. Such a phenomenon is referred to as “first mover advantage” in [21]. Finally, as shown
in the figure, when p1 and p2 become smaller, both R˜ and R¯ are closer to the Nash solution.
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IV. TWO-USER GAUSSIAN IC
For a general Gaussian IC, the capacity region is not known. While the full H-K rate region [2]
gives the largest known achievable rate region, as discussed in Section II-B, taking into account all
possible power splits and different time-sharing strategies makes it computationally infeasible.
For tractability, we consider a simple H-K type scheme with fixed power split and no time-
sharing. For the strong interference case, we set α = β = 0, which is known to be optimal [1].
For the weak and mixed interference cases, we choose the near-optimal power splits of [4]. For
weak interference a < 1 and b < 1, we set α = min(1/(bP1), 1) and β = min(1/(aP2), 1); for
mixed interference a < 1 and b ≥ 1, we set α = 0 and β = min(1/(aP2), 1). In the uncoordinated
case, each receiver treats the interfering signal as noise, leading to rates in disagreement point
R0 = (C( P1
1+aP2
) C( P2
1+bP1
))t.
The simple H-K scheme discussed above requires each user to split its rate for the benefit of
both users. However, it is not always true that each user will be able to improve its rate over
the disagreement point R0 as a result of the employed simple H-K scheme and the resulting
bargaining problem will be essential as defined in Section II-C. In order to ensure that both
selfish users will have motives to employ H-K coding, a pre-bargaining phase is added before
the actual bargaining phase. We refer to this pre-bargaining phase as phase 1 and the bargaining
phase that follows as phase 2.
In phase 1, users check whether the simple H-K scheme improves individual rates for both
over those in disagreement R0. If there is no improvement for at least one user, then that user
does not have the incentive to cooperate and negotiation breaks down. In such a scenario, users
operate at the disagreement point R0. Otherwise, they reach an agreement on the use of the
simple H-K scheme with the chosen power split and proceed to phase 2. In phase 2, the users
bargain for a rate pair to operate at over the achievable rate region of the H-K scheme they
agreed on earlier. The second phase can then be formulated as a two-user bargaining problem
with the feasibility set F defined in Section II-B and disagreement point R0. Once a particular
rate pair is determined as the solution of the second phase bargaining problem, related codebook
information is shared between the users so that one user’s receiver can decode the other user’s
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common message as required by the adopted H-K scheme. If negotiation breaks down, in phase
2, the receivers are not provided with the interfering user’s codebook.
A. Phase 1: the Pre-bargaining Phase
In this subsection, we discuss the pre-bargaining phase and study conditions under which both
users have incentives to engage in the use of the simple H-K scheme discussed above.
Proposition 4: For the two-user Gaussian IC, the pre-bargaining phase is successful and both
users have incentives to employ an H-K scheme provided one of the following conditions hold.
The conditions also list the H-K scheme employed by the users.
• Strong interference (a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1): Users always employ HK(0,0);
• Weak interference (a < 1 and b < 1): Users employ HK(1/(bP1),1/(aP2)) iff aP2 > 1 and
bP1 > 1 and F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty when α = 1/(bP1) and β = 1/(aP2);
• Mixed interference (a < 1 and b ≥ 1): Users employ HK(0,1/(aP2)) iff aP2 > 1 and
F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty when α = 0 and β = 1/(aP2).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Note that in the weak and mixed interference cases, when both SNR’s are high, the conditions
aP2 > 1 and bP1 > 1 are satisfied for most channel gains and it only remains to check whether
F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty. This implies that in the interference limited regimes, it is very
likely that both users would have incentives to cooperate.
B. Phase 2: the Bargaining Phase
1) Nash Bargaining Solution over IC: After the users agree on an H-K scheme, in phase
2, if bargaining is cooperative, the NBS over the corresponding rate region F is employed as
the operating point. Since the pre-bargaining in phase 1 is successful, we concentrate on the
case when R0 < R1 and A0R0 < B0 for the chosen HK(α, β) scheme and F ∩ {R > R0} is
nonempty. Applying Proposition 1 with the feasible set F and the disagreement point R0, we
have the following result.
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Proposition 5: Provided the pre-bargaining phase is successful, there exists a unique NBS for
the bargaining problem (F ,R0) in phase 2, which is characterized in Proposition 1 with G = F ,
g0 = R0 = (C( P1
1+aP2
) C( P2
1+bP1
))t, g1 = (C(P1) C(P2))
t
, A = A0 and B = B0.
We will elaborate on the NBS in Section IV-C.
2) Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games over IC: If bargaining is noncooperative in phase 2,
analysis for the AOBG over the IC is similar to that over the MAC in the Section III; however,
unlike in the MAC case, the associated bargaining problem over the IC is not always regular. If it
is non-regular, the AOBG may have more than one subgame perfect equilibria resulting in distinct
bargaining outcomes, which puts any of the subgame perfect equilibria and the corresponding
outcome in doubt [24]. Hence the non-regular case is not treated here. In the following, we
discuss the regularity of the associated bargaining problem in different interference regimes and
characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the AOBG when the bargaining problem
is regular.
Proposition 6: Provided the pre-bargaining phase is successful, in phase 2, the two-user
Gaussian IC bargaining problem (F ,R0) is regular iff one of the following conditions hold:
• Strong interference: a = b = 1;
• Weak interference: R01 ≥ (φ5 − 2φ2)+ and R02 ≥ (φ4 − 2φ1)+;
• Mixed interference: R01 ≥ (min(φ5− 2φ2, φ3−φ2))+ and R02 ≥ (min(φ4− 2φ1, φ3−φ1))+;
where φi, i = 1, ..., 5 are defined in (7)-(14).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Fig. 4 shows the set of cross-link power gains (a, b) for which the associated bargaining
problem is regular. Note the conditions for regularity not only include those in Proposition 6
but also those in Proposition 4 as well since we assume the pre-bargaining phase has been
successful. In Fig. 4(a), we have SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB. We observe that (F ,R0) is regular for
a large range of power gains in the weak interference regime. In Fig. 4(b), we set SNR1 = 20dB
and SNR2 = 30dB, and observe that, in addition to part of the weak interference regime,
(F ,R0) is also regular for a range of power gains in the mixed interference regime. Besides,
in both scenarios, the bargaining problem is regular for the special case of strong interference
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a = b = 1. Finally, note that in the noisy interference regime when a, b, P1 and P2 satisfy
√
a(bP1 + 1) +
√
b(aP2 + 1) ≤ 1 [3], since treating interference as noise is optimal, users never
employ the H-K scheme and the pre-bargaining phase always fails.
When pre-bargaining in phase 1 is successful and the Gaussian IC bargaining problem (F ,R0)
is regular, using Theorem 2, we have the following result.
Proposition 7: For any regular bargaining problem (F ,R0) over the two-user Gaussian IC,
the unique pair of agreements (R¯, R˜) in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the AOBG both
lie on the individual rational efficient frontier of F and satisfy (20) and (21) with R0 =
(C( P1
1+aP2
) C( P2
1+bP1
))t.
In the strong interference case a = b = 1, the unique pair of agreements (R¯, R˜) in the
subgame perfect equilibrium can be obtained using (35) in Proposition 3 with φ0 replaced by
φ6. For the weak and mixed interference cases, since the shape of the H-K rate region and
the relative location of the disagreement point vary as parameters a, b, P1 and P2 change, it is
difficult to obtain a general expression for (R¯, R˜). However, when all the parameters are given
and the corresponding power split parameters α and β are fixed, the H-K rate region and the
disagreement point R0 can be determined accordingly. Since (R¯, R˜) both lie on the individual
rational efficient frontier of F which is piecewise linear, we can compute (R¯, R˜) by solving
linear equations.
C. Illustration of Results
The achievable rate region of the H-K scheme with the optimal or near-optimal power split dis-
cussed earlier and the corresponding NBS (we refer to it as H-K NBS) together with disagreement
points are plotted for different values of channel parameters in Fig. 5. For comparison, we also
include the TDM regions and the corresponding NBS (we refer to it as TDM NBS). When TDM is
employed, user i transmits a fraction ρi(0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1) of the time under the constraint ρ1+ρ2 ≤ 1.
For a given vector ρ = (ρ1 ρ2)t, the rate obtained by user i is given by Ri(ρ) = Ri(ρi) = ρiC(Piρi ).
Hence, the TDM rate region is given by RTDM = {R|R = (R1(ρ1) R2(ρ2))t, ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ 1} and
the TDM NBS is computed as the solution to the bargaining problem (RTDM,R0). The NBS
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based on TDM was also investigated for a Gaussian interference game in [17] using the unique
competitive solution studied there as the disagreement point. Note that for TDM Proposition 5
applies and since the efficient frontier of the TDM rate region is strictly monotone, the associated
bargaining problem is regular as long as it is essential.
Since interference limited regimes are more of interest here, in these plots, we assume the
signal to noise ratios for both users’ direct links are high, i.e, SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB. In each
case, the channel parameters are chosen according to Proposition 4 so that the pre-bargaining
phase is successful. In Fig. 5(a), both interfering links are strong, HK(0, 0) is employed. The
H-K NBS strictly dominates the TDM one. Fig. 5(b) shows an example for mixed interference
with a = 0.1 and b = 3. Since aP2 = 10 > 1, HK(0, 0.1) is employed. In this example,
although TDM results in some rate pairs that are outside the H-K rate region, the H-K NBS
remains component-wise better than the TDM one. The weak interference case when a = 0.2 and
b = 0.5 is plotted in Fig. 5(c). For these parameters, we have aP2 = 20 > 1 and bP1 = 50 > 1,
therefore HK(0.02, 0.05) is used. The H-K NBS in this case, though still much better than R0,
is slightly worse than the TDM one. This is because the TDM rate region contains the H-K rate
region due to the suboptimality of the simple H-K scheme in the weak regime. Finally, recall
that while the TDM rate region does not depend on a and b, since R0 does, the TDM NBS
depends on a and b as well.
We compute the H-K NBS for different ranges of the channel parameters in Fig. 6. We assume
SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB, a = 1.5 and b varies from 0 to 3. The improvement of each user’s rate
in R∗ over the one in R0 increases as b grows. When b < a, user 1’s rate in the NBS is less
than user 2’s; however, as b grows beyond a, user 1’s rate in the NBS surpasses user 2’s, which
is due to the fairness property of the NBS. Alternatively we say a strong interfering link can
give user 1 an advantage in bargaining.
In Fig. 7, the unique pair of agreements (R¯, R˜) in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
AOBG is shown for mixed interference with a = 0.2, b = 1.2, SNR1 = 10dB and SNR2 = 20dB
for three different choices of the pair of probabilities of breakdown p1 and p2. According to
Proposition 4, in phase 1, the two users decide to cooperate using HK(0, 0.05). Furthermore, by
24
Proposition 6, the bargaining problem in phase 2 is regular. As in the MAC case, user 1’s offer
in subgame perfect equilibrium R¯ corresponds to the equilibrium outcome of the AOBG since
we assume user 1 makes an offer first. If user 2 moves first instead, user 2’s offer in subgame
perfect equilibrium R˜ would become the equilibrium outcome of the game. We can see that as
p1 and p2 change, R¯ and R˜ move along the individual rational efficient frontier of F . When
p1 = 0.5 and p2 = 0.5, user 1’s rate in R¯ is greater than that in the NBS; but when p1 = 0.1
and p2 = 0.5, its rate in R¯ is smaller than that in the NBS. As p1 and p2 decrease to 0.1, both
R¯ and R˜ become closer to the Nash solution. The rate of each user in the perfect equilibrium
outcome R¯ as a function of breakdown probability p1 is plotted in Fig. 8 when p2 is fixed to
0.5 under the above channel parameters. As p1 gets larger, user 1’s rate increases while user 2’s
decreases. The larger p1 becomes, the more likely that bargaining may permanently terminate
in disagreement when user 1’s offer is rejected by user 2. This demonstrates that if user 1 fears
less about bargaining breakdown, it can be more advantageous in bargaining. It should also be
emphasized that due to regularity the equilibrium is unique and agreement is reached in round
1 in equilibrium. In this sense, the bargaining mechanism of AOBG is highly efficient.
Fig. 9 illustrates the perfect equilibrium outcomes of the AOBG when the H-K and TDM
cooperating schemes are used respectively for an example of mixed interference with a = 0.2, b =
1.2, SNR1 = 20dB and SNR2 = 30dB. By Proposition’s 4, 6 and Fig. 4(b), incentive conditions
in phase 1 are satisfied and the bargaining problem is regular. The equilibrium outcomes of the
AOBG in the TDM case are obtained by applying Proposition 7. Since the boundary of the
TDM rate region is not linear, we compute the unique pair of (R¯, R˜) in TDM numerically. The
probabilities of breakdowns are set as p1 = p2 = 0.5. The NBS’s in both cases are also plotted
for reference. We observe that the individual rational efficient frontiers for the H-K and TDM
schemes intersect. Also, while user 2 gets higher rates in all the bargaining outcomes in TDM
than in H-K, user 1’s rates in H-K are superior to those in TDM. Hence, we can conclude that,
depending on the channel parameters and power constraints, the two users may have distinct
preferences between the transmission schemes employed.
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V. BARGAINING FOR THE GENERALIZED DEGREE OF FREEDOM
In the previous section, we have studied the bargaining problem in which the two selfish
users over a Gaussian IC bargain for a fair rate pair over the rate region achieved by the simple
H-K scheme. However, for fixed channel parameters a, b and power constraints P1 and P2, the
employed H-K scheme is a suboptimal one as it can only achieve within one bit to the capacity
region in the weak and mixed regimes. In this section, we focus our attention on certain high
SNR regimes when the simple H-K scheme becomes asymptotically optimal and employ the
g.d.o.f. as a performance measure for each user. As the g.d.o.f. approximates interference-limited
performance well at high SNR’s for all interference regimes, the results in this section help us
understand what the bargaining solution we would get if bargaining was done over the entire
capacity region. Before we deal with the bargaining problem, we briefly review the concept of
g.d.o.f. first.
Let C(SNR1, SNR2, INR1, INR2) denote the capacity region of a real Gaussian IC with pa-
rameters SNR1, SNR2, INR1 and INR2 defined in Section II, and let
θ1 =
log SNR2
log SNR1
θ2 =
log INR1
log SNR1
θ3 =
log INR2
log SNR1
Note that for the g.d.o.f analysis, θ1, θ2 and θ3 are fixed5. In this section, we only focus on the
nontrivial cases when θi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
The generalized degrees of freedom region is defined as [4]
D(θ1, θ2, θ3) = lim
SNR1,SNR2,INR1,INR2→∞
θ1,θ2,θ3 fixed
{(d1, d2)|
(
d1
2
log SNR1,
d2
2
log SNR2) ∈ C(SNR1, SNR2, INR1, INR2)} (41)
5Note that, to guarantee this, the channel parameters a and b need to change with power P1 and P2.
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The generalized degrees of freedom d1 and d2 reflect to what extent interference affects com-
munications. When the interference is absent, each user can achieve a rate Ri = 1/2 logSNRi;
as a result of interference, the single-user capacity is scaled by a factor di. The greater di is,
the less user i is affected by interference. The following theorem from [4] describes the optimal
g.d.o.f. region of a two-user Gaussian IC.
Theorem 3: In the strong interference regime INR1 ≥ SNR2 and INR2 ≥ SNR1 (θ2 ≥ θ1 and
θ3 ≥ 1), the g.d.o.f. region D1 is given by
d1 ≤ 1 (42)
d2 ≤ 1 (43)
d1 + θ1d2 ≤ ϕ1 = min(max(1, θ2),max(θ1, θ3)) (44)
and it is achieved by HK(0, 0).
In the weak interference regime INR1 < SNR2 and INR2 < SNR1 (θ2 < θ1 and θ3 < 1), the
g.d.o.f. region D2 is given by (42), (43) and
d1 + θ1d2 ≤ ϕ2 = min(1 + (θ1 − θ3)+, θ1 + (1− θ2)+,
max(θ2, 1− θ3) + max(θ3, θ1 − θ2))
(45)
2d1 + θ1d2 ≤ ϕ3 = max(1, θ2) + max(θ3, θ1 − θ2) + 1− θ3 (46)
d1 + 2θ1d2 ≤ ϕ4 = max(θ1, θ3) + max(θ2, 1− θ3) + θ1 − θ2 (47)
and it is achieved by HK(1/INR2, 1/INR1).
In the mixed interference regime INR1 ≥ SNR2 and INR2 < SNR1 (θ2 ≥ θ1 and θ3 < 1), the
g.d.o.f. region D3 is given by (42), (43) and
d1 + θ1d2 ≤ ϕ5 = min(1 + (θ1 − θ3)+,max(1, θ2)) (48)
d1 + 2θ1d2 ≤ ϕ6 = max(θ1, θ3) + max(θ2, 1− θ3) (49)
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and is achieved by HK(1/INR2, 0).
Each selfish user aims to merely increase its own g.d.o.f.. If the two users do not coordinate,
each user treats the other user’s signal as noise. In the uncoordinated case, the pair of rates in
disagreement are given by
R01 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
SNR1
1 + INR1
)
(50)
R02 =
1
2
log
(
1 +
SNR2
1 + INR2
)
(51)
and thus the corresponding disagreement g.d.o.f. pair d0 = (d01 d02)t can be obtained as
d01 = limSNR1,SNR2,INR1,INR2→∞
θ1,θ2,θ3 fixed
R01
1
2
log SNR1
= (1− θ2)+ (52)
and
d02 = limSNR1,SNR2,INR1,INR2→∞
θ1,θ2,θ3 fixed
R02
1
2
log SNR2
= (1− θ3
θ1
)+ (53)
The problem of obtaining a fair pair of g.d.o.f. can be formulated as a bargaining problem
with the feasible set being D(θ1, θ2, θ3) and the disagreement point being d0. The two-phase
mechanism of coordination proposed in Section IV can also be applied here. In the following,
Proposition 8 determines whether the two users have incentives to coordinate in phase 1 and
Proposition 9 then solves the bargaining problem in the second phase by selecting the NBS as the
desired operating point. A dynamic AOBG can also be formulated for the associated bargaining
problem (if the regularity condition holds) but will be omitted here.
Proposition 8: For the two-user Gaussian IC, the pre-bargaining phase is successful and both
users have incentives to employ an H-K scheme provided one of the following conditions hold.
The conditions also list the H-K scheme employed by the users.
• Strong interference (θ2 ≥ θ1 and θ3 ≥ 1): Users always employ HK(0,0);
• Weak interference (θ2 < θ1 and θ3 < 1): Users employ HK(1/INR2,1/INR1) iff (θ1, θ2, θ3)
are such that (d01, d02) satisfy (45)-(47) all with strict inequality;
• Mixed interference (θ2 ≥ θ1 and θ3 < 1): Users always employ HK(1/INR2,0).
28
Unlike in the strong and mixed interference regimes, in the weak interference regime the
two users may not both necessarily have the incentives to cooperate. For instance, if θ1 = 1,
0 < θ2 ≤ 12 and 0 < θ3 ≤ 12 , then d01+d02 = ϕ2 = 2−θ2−θ3. In this case, d0 lies on the boundary
of D2 and is Pareto optimal, thus there is no bargaining outcome that can improve one user’s
g.d.o.f. without decreasing the other’s. Also recall that in Section IV, in the mixed interference
regime a ≥ 1 and b < 1, for finite power constraints P1 and P2, even when INR2 = bP1 > 1, the
disagreement point R0 may not lie strictly inside the rate region achieved by HK(1/(bP1), 0)
and thus pre-bargaining in phase 1 could fail. However, by Proposition 8, at high SNR’s, the
pre-bargaining phase is always successful and both users have incentives to employ the simple
H-K scheme.
Proposition 9: Provided that the pre-bargaining in phase 1 is successful, the NBS in phase 2
can be characterized as follows:
• Strong interference (θ2 ≥ θ1 and θ3 ≥ 1): there exists a unique NBS for the bargaining
problem (D1,d0), which is characterized in Proposition 1 with G = D1, g0 = d0, g1 =
(1 1)t, A = (1 θ1), B = ϕ1;
• Weak interference (θ2 < θ1 and θ3 < 1): if the bargaining problem (D2,d0) is essential,
there exists a unique NBS which is characterized in Proposition 1 with G = D2, g0 = d0,
g1 = (1 1)t, B = (ϕ2 ϕ3 ϕ4)
t and
A =

 1 2 1
θ1 θ1 2θ1


t
; (54)
• Mixed interference (θ2 ≥ θ1) and θ3 < 1: there exists a unique NBS for the bargaining
problem (D3,d0) which is characterized in Proposition 1 with G = D3, g0 = d0, g1 = (1 1)t,
B = (ϕ5 ϕ6)
t and
A =

 1 1
θ1 2θ1


t
. (55)
The optimal g.d.o.f. region, the disagreement point and the NBS obtained are illustrated in
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Fig. 10 for an example in the mixed interference regime. For comparison, we also included the
g.d.o.f. region that can be achieved when TDM is used and the corresponding NBS. The g.d.o.f.
region in the TDM case is given by D4 = {d|d ≥ 0, d1 + d2 ≤ 1}, which is strictly suboptimal
except for some special cases such as the strong interference case with θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 1 and
the weak interference case with θ1 = 1 and θ2 = θ3 = 12 . The TDM NBS is computed as the
solution to the bargaining problem (D4,d0). It can be observed in Fig. 10 that the H-K NBS
strictly dominates the TDM NBS. This implies that unlike Fig. 9 in Section IV, in certain high
SNR regimes, both users would prefer to cooperate using the H-K scheme, rather than the TDM
scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the two-user Gaussian IC, under the assumption that the two
users are selfish and interested in coordinating their transmission strategies only when they have
incentives to do so. We proposed a two-phase mechanism for the users to coordinate, which
consists of choosing a simple H-K type scheme with Gaussian codebooks and fixed power split
in phase 1 and bargaining over the achievable rate region (or g.d.o.f. region) to obtain a fair
operating point in phase 2. Both the NBS and the dynamic AOBG are considered to solve the
bargaining problem in phase 2. As a problem of independent interest, and also as a tool for
developing the optimal solution in the strong interference regime, we first studied the MAC
before moving on to the IC. We showed that the proposed mechanism can gain substantial rate
improvements for both users compared with the uncoordinated case. The results from the dynamic
AOBG show that the bargaining game has a unique perfect equilibrium and the agreement is
reached immediately in the first bargaining round provided that the associated bargaining problem
is regular. The exogenous probabilities of breakdown and which user makes a proposal first also
play important roles in the final outcome. When the selfish users’ cost of delay in bargaining are
not negligible, that is, exogenous probabilities of breakdown are high, the equilibrium outcome
deviates from the NBS. We conclude that when we consider coordination and bargaining over
the IC, factors such as the users’ cost of delay in bargaining and the environment in which
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bargaining takes place should also be taken into consideration.
In this paper, we derived the cost of delay in bargaining from an exogenous probability of
breakdown motivated by the fact that other users in the environment may randomly interrupt
the process and the bargaining between a pair of users may terminate in disagreement if no
offer is accepted after each round. It would be also interesting to model users’ cost of delay
in bargaining under other assumptions such as each user’s payoff is discounted by a factor of
δ after each round [27] [25] or the amount of communication overhead incurred. Finally, the
bargaining framework in this paper can be extended to the two-user MIMO IC using the results
of [28] [29] [30] [31].
APPENDIX A
THE EXTENSIVE GAME WITH PERFECT INFORMATION AND CHANCE MOVES
Definition 1: An extensive game with perfect information Γ = 〈N,H, P, (i)〉 has the fol-
lowing components [21]:
• A player set N .
• A history set H . Each history in H is a sequence of the form (e1, ..., eK), where ek (k =
1, ..., K) is an action taken by a player. If K is∞, the history is infinite. A history (e1, ..., eK)
is terminal if it is infinite or if there is no eK+1 such that (e1, ..., eK+1) ∈ H . The set of
terminal histories and that of nonterminal histories are denoted Q and H \Q respectively.
• A player function P (h) that assigns to each nonterminal history h ∈ H \ Q a member of
N .
• For each player i ∈ N a preference relation i on Q.
Let h be a history of length K and e be an action. We denote by (h, e) the history of length
K + 1 consisting of h followed by e. After any nonterminal history h ∈ H \ Q, player P (h)
chooses an action from the set E(h) = {e|(h, e) ∈ H}.
Definition 2: A strategy of player i ∈ N in the extensive game Γ = 〈N,H, P, (i)〉 is a
function si that assigns an action in E(h) to each nonterminal history h ∈ H \ Q for which
P (h) = i.
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Let s = (si)i∈N be the strategy profile and s−i be the list of strategies (sj)j∈N\{i} for all
players except i. Given a list (sj)j∈N\{i} and a strategy si, we also denote by (s−i, si) the
strategy profile. For each strategy profile s, we define the outcome O(s) of s to be the terminal
history that results when each player i ∈ N follows the precepts of si.
Definition 3: A Nash equilibrium of the extensive game Γ = 〈N,H, P, (i)〉 is a strategy
profile s∗ such that for every player i ∈ N and for every strategy si of player i, we have
O(s∗−i, s
∗
i ) i O(s∗−i, si) (56)
Definition 4: The subgame of the extensive game Γ = 〈N,H, P, (i)〉 that follows the history
h is the extensive game Γ(h) = 〈N,H|h, P |h, (i |h)〉, where H|h is the set of sequences h′ of
actions for which (h, h′) ∈ H , P |h is defined by P |h(h′) = P (h, h′) for each h′ ∈ H|h, and
i |h is defined by h′ i |hh′′ if and only if (h, h′) i (h, h′′).
Given a strategy si of player i and a history h in the extensive game Γ, denote by si|h the
strategy that si induces in the subgame Γ(h) (i.e., si|h(h′) = si(h, h′) for each h′ ∈ H|h).
Definition 5: A subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game Γ = 〈N,H, P, (i)〉 is a
strategy profile s∗ in Γ such that for any history h, the strategy profile s∗|h is a Nash equilibrium
of the subgame Γ(h).
A subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the whole game with additional
property that the equilibrium strategies induce a Nash equilibrium in every subgame as well.
If there is some exogenous uncertainty, the game becomes one with chance moves and we
denote it by 〈N,H, P, fc, (i)〉. Under such an extension, P is a function from the nonterminal
histories in H to N ∪{c} (If P (h) = c, then chance determines the action taken after history h);
for each h ∈ H with P (h) = c, fc(·|h) is a probability measure on the set E(h) after history h;
for each player i ∈ N , i is a preference relation on lotteries over the set of terminal histories.
The outcome of a strategy profile is a probability distribution over terminal histories and the
definition of an subgame perfect equilibrium remains the same as before.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
• In the strong interference case a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1, we choose optimal α = β = 0. Treating
interference as noise is suboptimal and R0 always lies inside F . The bargaining problem
(F ,R0) is essential and hence both users always have incentives to cooperate.
• In the weak interference a < 1 and b < 1, we choose the near-optimal power splits α =
min(1/(bP1), 1) and β = min(1/(aP2), 1). If bP1 ≤ 1, the scheme HK(1, β) will not
improve user 2’s rate over R0 and hence user 2 does not have an incentive to cooperate
using such a scheme. The same will occur to user 1 if aP2 ≤ 1 and HK(α, 1) is employed.
However, if aP2 > 1 and bP1 > 1 and F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty when α = 1/(bP1) and
β = 1/(aP2), both users’ rates can be improved compared with those in R0.
• In the mixed interference with a < 1 and b ≥ 1, we choose the near-optimal power
splits α = 0 and β = min(1/(aP2), 1). Similar to the weak case, only if aP2 > 1 and
F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty when α = 0 and β = 1/(aP2), it is possible to improve both
users’ rates relative to those in R0. Otherwise, at least one user does not have an incentive
to cooperate and coordination breaks down.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
• In the strong interference case, at phase 1, the users choose optimal α = β = 0. The resulting
capacity region is shown in Fig. 11(a). Note that only two extreme points of the region are
in the first quadrant and they are r1 = (φ6−C(P2), C(P2)) and r2 = (C(P1), φ6−C(P1)).
It is easy to show that R01 ≤ φ6−C(P2) and R02 ≤ φ6−C(P1) with equalities holding only
when a = b = 1. In order for the individual rational efficient frontier to be strictly monotone,
it must contain no horizonal or vertical line segments, which requires R01 ≥ φ6 − C(P2)
and R02 ≥ φ6 − C(P1). Hence, the associated bargaining problem is regular iff a = b = 1.
• In the weak interference case a < 1 and b < 1, by Proposition 4, in phase 1, both users have
incentives to cooperate using HK(1/(bP1), 1/(aP2)) if aP2 > 1, bP1 > 1 and F∩{R > R0}
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is nonempty when α = 1/(bP1) and β = 1/(aP2). The shape of achievable rate region is
shown in Fig. 11(b). It has been proved in [23] that the points r′i /∈ F for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6}.
Therefore there are at most6 four extreme points in the first quadrant of Fig. 11(b), given
by
r1 = (φ1, φ4 − 2φ1) (57)
r2 = (φ4 − φ3, 2φ3 − φ4) (58)
r3 = (2φ3 − φ5, φ5 − φ3) (59)
r4 = (φ5 − 2φ2, φ2) (60)
where φi, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 5} are given in (7)-(14) with α = 1/(bP1) and β = 1/(aP2). In
order for the individual rational efficient frontier to be strictly monotone, it must contain no
horizonal or vertical line segments. If r1 is in the first quadrant, R02 ≥ φ4 − 2φ1 must hold
and similarly if r4 is in the first quadrant, R01 ≥ φ5− 2φ2 must hold. Hence, the associated
bargaining problem in the weak interference case is regular iff two additional conditions
R01 ≥ (φ5 − 2φ2)+ and R02 ≥ (φ4 − 2φ1)+ are satisfied.
• In the mixed interference case a < 1 and b ≥ 1, by Proposition 4, in phase 1, both users
cooperate using HK(0, 1/(aP2)) if aP2 > 1 and F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty when α = 0
and β = 1/(aP2). Similar to the weak interference case, there are at most four extreme
points in the first quadrant of Fig. 11(b) except that r′1 = (φ1, φ3−φ1) or r′5 = (φ3−φ2, φ2)
may become an extreme point of F , depending on whether the constraint (13) or (14) is
redundant or not respectively. In order for the individual rational efficient frontier to be
strictly monotone, it must contain no horizonal or vertical line segments. If r1 and r′1 are
both in the first quadrant, R02 ≥ min(φ4 − 2φ1, φ3 − φ1) must hold and if r4 and r′5 are
both in the first quadrant, R01 ≥ min(φ5 − 2φ2, φ3 − φ2) must hold. Hence, the associated
bargaining problem in the mixed interference case a < 1 and b ≥ 1 is regular iff two
6In [23], the authors concluded that there should be exactly four extreme points in the first quadrant, but we find that under
some parameters one or two of the four points may actually not lie in the first quadrant. For instance, it is possible that
φ5 − 2φ2 < 0, in which case r4 is not in the first quadrant.
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additional conditions R01 ≥ (min(φ5−2φ2, φ3−φ2))+ and R02 ≥ (min(φ4−2φ1, φ3−φ1))+
are satisfied.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
For all interference regimes, since we assume θi > 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, it immediately follows
that d01 < 1 and d02 < 1.
• In the strong interference regime, we have θ2 ≥ θ1 and θ3 ≥ 1. Depending on the values
of θ1, θ2 and θ3, we have the following four cases:
– Case 1: θ2 ≥ 1 and θ3 ≥ θ1. In this case, d01 + θ1d02 = 0 and ϕ1 = min(θ2, θ3) > 0.
Therefore, d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ1 holds.
– Case 2: θ2 < 1 and θ3 ≥ θ1. In this case, d01 + θ1d02 = 1 − θ2 and ϕ1 = min(1, θ3) =
1 > 1− θ2. Therefore, d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ1 holds.
– Case 3: θ2 ≥ 1 and θ3 < θ1. In this case, d01 + θ1d02 = θ1 − θ3 and ϕ1 = min(θ2, θ1) =
θ1 > θ1 − θ3. Therefore, d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ1 holds.
– Case 4: θ2 < 1 and θ3 < θ1. In this case, d01+θ1d02 = 1−θ2+θ1−θ3 and ϕ1 = min(1, θ1).
Since 1− θ2 + θ1 − θ3 ≤ 1− θ3 < 1 and 1− θ2 + θ1 − θ3 ≤ −θ2 + θ1 < θ1, it follows
that 1− θ2 + θ1 − θ3 < min(1, θ1). Therefore, d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ1 holds.
Hence, d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ1 holds for all the values of the parameters in the range, and we
can conclude that d0 is strictly inside of D1 and the bargaining problem (D1,d0) is always
essential.
• In the weak interference regime, we have θ2 < θ1 and θ3 < 1. In order for both users to
have incentives to cooperate using HK(1/INR2,1/INR1), d0 needs to lie strictly inside of
D2, which is not true for all parameters of θ1,θ2,θ3. It happens only when (θ1, θ2, θ3) are
such that (d01, d02) satisfy (45)-(47) all with strict inequality.
• In the mixed interference regime, we have θ2 ≥ θ1 and θ3 < 1. Depending on the values of
θ1, θ2 and θ3, we have the following four cases:
– Case 1: θ2 ≤ 1 and θ3 ≥ θ1. In this case, d01+θ1d02 = d01+2θ1d02 = 1−θ2 and ϕ5 = 1 >
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1− θ2. Therefore, d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ5 holds. Note that ϕ6 = max(θ2 + θ3, 1) ≥ 1 > 1− θ2,
hence d01 + 2θ1d02 < ϕ6 also holds.
– Case 2: θ2 > 1 and θ3 ≥ θ1. In this case, d01 + θ1d02 = d01+2θ1d02 = 0 and ϕ5 = θ2 > 0.
Therefore, d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ5 holds. Also ϕ6 = θ2 + θ3 > 0 and d01 + 2θ1d02 < ϕ6 holds.
– Case 3: θ2 > 1 and θ3 < θ1. In this case, d01+θ1d02 = θ1−θ3 and ϕ5 = min(1+θ1−θ3, θ2).
Since θ1 − θ3 < θ1 ≤ θ2, it follows that d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ5. d01 + 2θ1d02 = 2(θ1 − θ3) and
ϕ6 = θ1 + θ2 ≥ 2θ1 > 2(θ1 − θ3). Therefore d01 + 2θ1d02 < ϕ6 also holds.
– Case 4: θ2 ≤ 1 and θ3 < θ1. In this case, d01 + θ1d02 = 1 − θ2 + θ1 − θ3 ≤ 1 − θ3 < 1
and ϕ5 = 1. It follows that d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ5. d01 + 2θ1d02 = 1 − θ2 + 2(θ1 − θ3) and
ϕ6 = θ1 + max(θ2, 1 − θ3). If θ2 ≤ 1 − θ3, then ϕ6 = θ1 + 1 − θ3. d01 + 2θ1d02 −
ϕ6 = −θ2 + θ1 − θ3 ≤ −θ3 < 0. Otherwise if θ2 > 1 − θ3, then ϕ6 = θ1 + θ2.
d01 +2θ1d
0
2−ϕ6 = 1+ θ1− 2θ2− 2θ3 = −θ3 + (1− θ3− θ2) + (θ1− θ2) < 0. Therefore
d01 + 2θ1d
0
2 < ϕ6 also holds.
Hence, d01 + θ1d02 < ϕ5 and d01 + 2θ1d02 < ϕ6 hold for all values of the parameters in the
range, and we can conclude that d0 is strictly inside of D3 and the bargaining problem
(D3,d0) is always essential.
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Fig. 3. Bargaining rates over the MAC when SNR1 = 20dB, SNR2 = 15dB
39
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Cross−link power gain a
Cr
os
s−
lin
k 
po
we
r g
ai
n 
b
(a) SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB
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(b) SNR1 = 20dB, SNR2 = 30dB
Fig. 4. Set of cross-link power gains for which pre-bargaining in phase 1 is successful and the associated bargaining problem
is regular.
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(a) Strong interference a = 3, b = 5
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Fig. 5. The H-K and TDM NBS of the Gaussian IC in different interference regimes when SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB
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Fig. 6. Rates in NBS R∗ and disagreement point R0 as a function of cross-link power gain b when SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB
and cross-link power gain a = 1.5.
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